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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF KANSAS
Olivia Gibbs,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 10-2421-JWL
ADS Alliance Data Systems, Inc.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant asserting claims of disability discrimination and
claim under Kansas law for workers’ compensation retaliation. This matter is presently before
explained, the motion is denied.
I. Facts
The following facts are uncontroverted or related in the light most favorable to plaintiff, 
the nonmoving party. Defendant ADS Alliance Data Systems, Inc. operates a facility in Lenexa, 
Kansas which, among other business activities, engages in retail credit card customer service and 
collections. Plaintiff Olivia Gibbs began working for defendant as a Sales and Service 
Representative in October 2006. In April 2008, plaintiff was promoted to the position of 
Recovery Trainee. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Cheryl Gonzales was plaintiff’ s 
immediate supervisor and Susan Brown served as the human resources manager at defendant’s
retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and a
the court on defendant’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 26) on all claims. As will be
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Lenexa facility. During her employment with defendant, plaintiff also worked for CVS 
pharmacy.
In June 2008, plaintiff suffered an on-the-job accident at CVS and, as a result of that 
accident, plaintiff’s physician conducted a nerve study and determined that the repetitive nature 
of plaintiff’ s work at defendant caused her to develop carpal tunnel syndrome. In August 2008, 
plaintiff filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits with the State of Kansas. Plaintiff 
underwent carpal tunnel surgery on her right wrist on December 3, 2008 and she returned to 
work on Friday, December 12, 2008 with restrictions-namely, she was permitted to work only 
with her left hand. Although defendant apparently placed plaintiff in a light duty assignment that 
it believed would not require the use of her right hand, plaintiff’ s evidence reflects that her 
production numbers were not reduced in any respect such that she was forced to use her right 
hand to “keep up” and that she could not perform certain key strokes with only one hand. On 
December 13, 2008, the day after she returned to work, plaintiff wrote a letter to Susan Brown 
requesting a different light duty assignment that would permit plaintiff to use only her left hand. 
During this same time, plaintiff asked permission for a schedule change so that she could take 
the bus to and from work as opposed to driving herself to work.
While the record does not reflect whether plaintiff’s requests were granted, the record 
does contain evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, that defendant’s 
management employees, particularly Susan Brown, were frustrated with plaintiff’s condition and 
her resulting requests for accommodation. Plaintiff testified that on one occasion, she called Ms. 
Brown to advise her that she was going to be delayed in connection with a doctor’s appointment
2
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because of the bus route and schedule. According to plaintiff, Ms. Brown “screamed” at her on 
the phone and told her that she would not have any more phone discussions with plaintiff and 
that every in-person conversation would be documented. In December 2009, plaintiff notified 
Ms. Brown and Ms. Gonzales that she would need to have numerous surgeries in 2009-including 
carpal tunnel surgery on her left hand.1 Plaintiff testified that, around that same time, Ms. 
Gonzales told her that she and Ms. Brown had reviewed plaintiff’ s personnel file and determined 
that “they were losing money” on her.
On January 8, 2009, plaintiff’s physician released her to full duty with no work 
restrictions. The following day, Susan Brown allegedly observed plaintiff soliciting employees 
to buy Avon products. According to Ms. Brown, she confirmed that plaintiff was on the clock 
at the time she was allegedly soliciting employees and then made the decision to terminate 
plaintiff’s employment for violating defendant’s Solicitation and Distribution Policy. That policy 
allows certain types of solicitation during non-work time and prohibits other types of solicitation 
entirely. The written policy states that an employee who violates the policy “may be subject to 
counseling regarding your behavior.” Plaintiff’s employment, then, was terminated on January 
10, 2009. Ms. Gonzales was not involved in the decision to terminate plaintiff’ s employment.
Additional facts will be related, as necessary, in connection with the court’ s analysis of 
defendant’s motion and plaintiff’s particular claims.
1The other surgeries were unrelated to plaintiff’ s carpal tunnel condition.
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II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a). In applying this standard, the court views the evidence and make inferences in the light
most favorable to the non-movant. Kerber v. Qwest Group Life Ins. P lan ,___F .3d___ , 2011
WL 2151201, at *7 (10th Cir. June 2, 2011). A dispute is genuine if “the evidence is such that 
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” on the issue. Id. (quoting 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Although the court views the 
evidence and draws reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, “the nonmoving party must present more than a scintilla of evidence in favor 
of his position.” Id. (quoting Ford  v. Pryor, 552 F.3d 1174, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 2008)).
III. ADA Claims
In the pretrial order, plaintiff sets forth two claims under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Her first claim is that defendant terminated plaintiff’ s 
employment on the basis of her disability, her bilateral carpal tunnel condition. Her second 
claim is that defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment in retaliation for plaintiff’s engaging 
in protected activity under the ADA. Defendant moves for summary judgment on both claims.2
2The “Nature of the Case” portion of the pretrial order includes a reference to “claims 
involving . . . hostile work environment on the basis of disability.” However, the more 
specific “Theories of Recovery” portion of the pretrial order is limited to only three 
claims-the discriminatory discharge and retaliation claims under the ADA and the workers’
4
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As will be explained, the motion is denied.
A. Discrimination Claim
The analytical framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas controls the court’s analysis 
of plaintiff’ s disability discrimination claim because she seeks to proceed to trial exclusively on 
the basis of circumstantial evidence of discrimination. See Johnson v. Weld County, Colo., 594 
F.3d 1202, 1217 (10th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination, showing a genuine issue of material fact exists on each of three points: 
“(1) she is a disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) she is qualified, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired; and (3) 
her employer discriminated against her because of her disability.” Id. If the plaintiff establishes 
a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason for its employment decision. Should the defendant articulate a nondiscriminatory reason, 
the burden shifts back to plaintiff to show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
defendant’s reason for the discharge is pretextual.” Id.
With respect to the first prong of plaintiff’s prima facie case, defendant begins by 
conceding, as it must, that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) has “lowered the bar” 
on the disability inquiry. Indeed, the ADAAA was passed in response to decisions by the U.S.
compensation retaliation claim. Moreover, neither party mentions any hostile work 
environment claim in the summary judgment submissions. The court, then, assumes that any 
hostile work environment theory has been abandoned by plaintiff.
5
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Supreme Court that, according to Congress, had “created an inappropriately high level of 
limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA,” and was intended to reinstate “a broad 
scope of protection . . . available under the ADA.” See Norton v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc.,
___F. Supp. 2 d ___ , 2011 WL 1832952, at *7 (E.D. Tex. May 13, 2011) (citations omitted).
While an ADA plaintiff must still show that he or she has a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits a major life activity, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), the ADAAA has 
“significantly expanded” the terms within that definition in favor of broad coverage. See Norton,
___F. Supp. 2d a t____ , 2011 WL 1832952, at *7. In expanding the definition of disability,
Congress intended to convey “that the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a 
disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis” and that the “primary object 
of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA 
have complied with their obligations.” See id. (citations omitted). Consistent with this purpose, 
the implementing regulations state that the terms “substantially limiting” and “major” are not 
intended to be “demanding” standards. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2) & (j)(1)(i) (2011).
Recognizing, then, that the court must consider the evidence of plaintiff’ s alleged 
disability through the lens of the less demanding standard of disability set forth in the ADAAA, 
defendant’s argument in support of its motion for summary judgment on this issue is decidedly 
brief-it asserts only that plaintiff has the burden to prove that her impairment substantially limits 
a major life activity despite the broader reach of the ADAAA. After examining the evidence in 
the record bearing on this issue (certainly there is some evidence that plaintiff’s condition 
affected her ability to perform manual tasks), and keeping in mind that this inquiry is not meant
6
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to be “extensive” or demanding, the court concludes that genuine issues of material fact exist as 
to whether plaintiff’ s carpal tunnel syndrome constitutes a disability within the meaning of the 
ADA.
Defendant next contends that plaintiff cannot establish the third element of her prima 
facie case. According to defendant, the termination of plaintiff’ s employment was unrelated to 
her carpal tunnel condition. In support of this contention, defendant urges that plaintiff was 
terminated for violating the company’s Solicitation and Distribution policy. The court, of 
course, cannot consider this evidence at the prima facie stage. See, e.g., EEOC v. Horizon/CMS 
Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1192-94 (10th Cir. 2000) (requiring plaintiff to disprove 
defendant’s proffered reason for employment decision to establish prima facie case would 
inappropriately short circuit McDonnell Douglas analysis and frustrate plaintiff’s ability to 
establish pretext). In any event, as explained below in connection with the pretext analysis, 
plaintiff has come forward with evidence that her employment was terminated under 
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Butler v. City o f  Prairie Village, 
172 F.3d 736, 748-49 (10th Cir. 1999) (to establish the third element of a prima facie case of 
disability discrimination, the plaintiff must show that she was terminated because of her 
disability, or that the employer terminated the plaintiff “under circumstances which give rise to 
an inference that the termination was based on her disability).
Consistent with the McDonnell Douglas analysis, defendant next contends that plaintiff 
cannot establish that defendant’s proffered reason for terminating plaintiff’ s employment is 
pretextual. According to Ms. Brown, she observed plaintiff, on January 9, 2009, approaching
7
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and soliciting employees to buy Avon products. Ms. Brown avers that she then contacted 
plaintiff’ s supervisor, Ms. Gonzalez, to “inquire as to whether Ms. Gibbs was on the clock or on 
a break or lunch.” According to Ms. Brown, Ms. Gonzalez told her that “Ms. Gibbs was 
supposed to be working and was not on break or lunch.” Ms. Brown, then, decided to terminate 
plaintiff’ s employment for violating defendant’s Solicitation and Distribution policy. According 
to plaintiff’s testimony, at the time she allegedly tried to sell Avon products to a coworker, she 
was simply standing by the desk of a coworker, a woman named Rebekah Bishop with whom 
plaintiff was close friends. Plaintiff testified that she had clocked out of work for the day, was 
already wearing her coat and hat and had her Avon bag over her shoulder ready to leave for the 
day. She testified that she and Ms. Bishop were not discussing Avon products in any event. Ms. 
Bishop testified that plaintiff has never sold or offered to sell Avon products to her.
While defendant has certainly satisfied its burden of articulating a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s discharge, the court concludes that plaintiff’s evidence 
is sufficient to cast doubt on Ms. Brown’s testimony and to withstand summary judgment on this 
claim. While defendant urges that plaintiff’s “subjective evaluation” of the situation is irrelevant 
and that the court should focus only on Ms. Brown’s “sincere beliefs,” Ms. Brown’s testimony 
provides no context from which the court might ascertain the sincerity of her belief that plaintiff 
was soliciting coworkers during working time. Ms. Brown does not explain why she concluded 
that plaintiff was selling Avon products to a coworker or where and when she observed plaintiff. 
Rather, her testimony on this subject is conclusory-she avers only that she observed plaintiff 
soliciting coworkers to buy Avon products. The court, then, is left with plaintiff’s description
8
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of the events. If, as described by plaintiff, Ms. Brown simply observed plaintiff talking to Ms. 
Bishop at Ms. Bishop’s desk, wearing her coat and hat with her Avon bag over her shoulder, 
then a jury could reasonably conclude that Ms. Brown did not sincerely believe that plaintiff was 
violating the solicitation policy or that Ms. Brown’s conclusion in that respect was not 
reasonable in light of the circumstances. In these circumstances, plaintiff’ s testimony that she 
was, in fact, not engaged in solicitation, corroborated by Ms. Bishop, calls into question Ms. 
Brown’s testimony on that subject. An application of the “honest belief’ rule, then, is 
inappropriate. See Orr v. City o f  Albuquerque, 531 F.3d 1210, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2008) (fact 
question existed as to whether personnel director’s decision was based on honest belief or 
intentional discrimination).
Other pieces of evidence further support the court’s conclusion that plaintiff has satisfied 
her pretext burden. Defendant’s solicitation policy, on its face, does not contemplate termination 
for a violation of the policy; it states that an employee who violates the policy “may” be subject 
to counseling.3 Ms. Brown’s decision to terminate plaintiff’ s employment rather than counsel 
plaintiff as per the written policy further calls into doubt Ms. Brown’s decision, particularly in 
the absence of evidence that plaintiff had ever previously been counseled for solicitation or 
violating any other work rule. See Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1119 (10th
3Defendant contends that its termination policy provides for immediate discharge of 
any employee engaged in solicitation during work time. The termination policy, however, is 
at best ambiguous on this subject and appears to indicate that an employee may be terminated 
for solicitation only when the particular type of solicitation is entirely prohibited by the 
solicitation policy such as selling raffle tickets, seeking donations, and selling club 
memberships.
9
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Cir. 2007) (“It is well-established that pretext can be shown by ‘evidence that the defendant 
acted contrary to a written company policy prescribing the action to be taken by the defendant 
under the circumstances.’”). Finally, plaintiff testified in her deposition that her supervisor, 
Cheryl Gonzales, told her that she and Ms. Brown had “reviewed” plaintiff’s personnel file and 
“that they were losing money on me.”4 According to plaintiff’s evidence, this statement was 
made in December 2009 in connection with plaintiff advising her supervisor that she needed to 
have additional surgeries after the first of the year-one related to her carpal tunnel condition. 
While it is unclear from the record whether this alleged statement was intended to refer to 
plaintiff’ s condition (and the related surgeries, work restrictions and time away from work), the 
court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the statement is not linked to plaintiff’s condition. 
In short, plaintiff has come forward with evidence sufficient to call into question defendant’s 
proffered reason for plaintiff’ s discharge. Summary judgment on this claim, then, is denied.
B. Retaliation Claim
The court turns, then, to plaintiff’s second ADA claim, that defendant terminated 
plaintiff’s employment in retaliation for plaintiff’ s engaging in protected activity under the ADA. 
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff must show that she engaged in protected 
opposition to discrimination; that defendant took an adverse employment action against her
4Defendant contends that plaintiff’ s testimony on this subject constitutes inadmissible 
hearsay. In fact, the statements are nonhearsay pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2)(D) as admissions of party opponents.
10
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which a reasonable person would have found materially adverse; and that a causal connection 
exists between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. See Hennagir v. Utah 
Dept. o f  Corrections, 587 F.3d 1255, 1265 (10th Cir. 2009).
In its motion for summary judgment, defendant first contends that plaintiff cannot 
establish a causal connection between her protected activity and her termination because there 
is no evidence showing that Ms. Brown, at the time she terminated plaintiff’s employment, had 
knowledge that plaintiff had engaged in protected activity. See id. at 1267 (“To establish 
causation in an ADA retaliation action . . . a plaintiff must also demonstrate that the individual 
who engaged in a materially adverse action knew about the protected activity.”). Defendant has 
not shown that it is entitled to summary judgment on this basis. While it is undisputed that Ms. 
Brown did not learn that plaintiff had formally complained about disability discrimination until 
after plaintiff’s January 10, 2009 termination (when Ms. Brown received plaintiff’ s July 2009 
EEOC charge), it is nonetheless clear that Ms. Brown, at the time she terminated plaintiff’ s 
employment, had knowledge of Ms. Brown’s December 13, 2008 request for a light duty 
assignment and her request for a schedule change. The Tenth Circuit has recognized that 
requests for reasonable accommodation constitute protected activity under the ADA. See Jones 
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 1194 (10th Cir. 2007). Because defendant has not 
raised the issue, the court need not address at this juncture whether Ms. Brown’s requests were 
reasonable. Simply put, defendant has not shown the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether Ms. Brown had knowledge of plaintiff’ s protected activity and defendant does not 
otherwise challenge plaintiff’s prima facie case of retaliation.
11
Case 2:10-cv-02421-JWL Document 34 Filed 07/28/11 Page 12 of 15
As noted earlier, plaintiff has satisfied its burden of articulating a legitimate, 
nonretaliatory reason for terminating plaintiff’s employment-plaintiff’ s alleged violation of 
defendant’s solicitation policy. See Hennagir, 587 F.3d at 1265 (utilizing McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting analysis in context of ADA retaliation claim). For largely the same reasons 
described in connection with plaintiff’s discrimination claim, plaintiff has satisfied her pretext 
burden. In the face of Ms. Brown’s conclusory testimony about plaintiff’ s solicitation activities, 
plaintiff has come forward with evidence from which a jury could conclude that Ms. Brown’s 
asserted belief that plaintiff was violating the policy was either dishonest or irrational. Plaintiff 
has also come forward with evidence that Ms. Brown acted contrary to defendant’s written 
policy concerning appropriate discipline for employees who violate the solicitation policy. 
Moreover, with particular application in the retaliation context, the timing of the decision to 
terminate plaintiff’ s employment-just 4 weeks after plaintiff requested an accommodation based 
on her condition-is sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendant’s 
proffered reason for terminating plaintiff’ s employment was pretextual. Annett v. University o f  
Kansas, 371 F.3d 1233, 1240 (10th Cir. 2004) (close temporal proximity is a factor in showing 
pretext). Summary judgment on this claim, then, is denied.
IV. Workers’ Compensation Retaliation
Kansas courts also apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to claims 
of employment discrimination, including claims of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers’ 
compensation claim. Proctor v. United Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200, 1211 (10th Cir. 2007)
12
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(citations omitted). Thus, plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Id. at 
1212. If she meets this burden, defendant must come forward with a legitimate, nonretaliatory 
reason for the discharge. Id. Plaintiff then has the burden of showing “by a preponderance of 
the evidence” that this legitimate reason is a pretext for retaliation in violation of state law. Id.
To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under Kansas law, plaintiff must establish 
that (1) she filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits or sustained an injury for which she 
might assert a future claim for such benefits; (2) defendant had knowledge of plaintiff’ s workers’ 
compensation claim or injury; (3) defendant terminated plaintiff’ s employment; and (4) a causal 
connection existed between the protected activity or injury and the termination. Id. In its motion 
for summary judgment, defendant concedes that plaintiff has satisfied the first three elements 
of her prima facie case. Defendant contends, however, that plaintiff cannot establish the fourth 
element regarding causation. According to defendant, there is no evidence in the record that any 
management employee bore any retaliatory animus toward plaintiff as a result of her workers’ 
compensation claim.
The court begins by recognizing that a plaintiff’s prima facie burden in workers’ 
compensation retaliation cases is not onerous. See Rebarchek v. Farmers Co-op. Elevator, 272 
Kan. 546, 557 (2001) (claimant’s prima facie burden in workers’ compensation retaliation case 
is not onerous). Bearing that in mind, the court concludes that plaintiff has satisfied her burden 
here. As described earlier in connection with plaintiff’ s discrimination claim, plaintiff testified 
in her deposition that Ms. Gonzales told her that she and Ms. Brown had “reviewed” plaintiff’ s 
personnel file and “that they were losing money on me.” Viewing the evidence in the light most
13
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favorable to plaintiff, the statement was made in December 2009 in connection with plaintiff 
advising her supervisor that she needed to have additional surgeries after the first of the year-one 
related to her workers’ compensation injury. While it is unclear from the record whether this 
alleged statement was intended to refer to plaintiff’ s workers’ compensation injury (and the 
related surgeries, work restrictions and time away from work), the court cannot conclude as a 
matter of law that the statement is not linked to plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim and/or 
injury. In sum, the court concludes that plaintiff has come forward with evidence sufficient to 
satisfy her prima facie case.
As noted above, defendant has asserted a facially legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for 
plaintiff’ s discharge-her violation of defendant’s solicitation policy. Nonetheless, as also 
described above, plaintiff has come forward with sufficient evidence of pretext to survive 
summary judgment on this claim. There is evidence from which a jury could reasonably 
conclude that Ms. Brown did not honestly believe that plaintiff was in violation of the 
solicitation policy at the time she terminated plaintiff and that Ms. Brown acted contrary to 
defendant’s own policy prescribing the appropriate disciplinary action to be taken under the 
circumstances. This evidence, taken together with the statement-allegedly made only a few 
weeks before plaintiff’s termination-that defendant was “losing money” on plaintiff, is sufficient 
for plaintiff to present this claim to a jury. Summary judgment is denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment (doc. 26) is denied.
14
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 28th day of July, 2011, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ John W. Lungstrum 
John W. Lungstrum 
United States District Judge
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